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ABSTRACT
The Norwegian pension system has provided unprecedented flexibility to combine work and pen-
sion drawing from the age of 62, and this has become a popular option. Using qualitative inter-
views with 28 older workers, we explore their information strategies and motivations. We find 
that many informants struggle to understand the various options and their consequences and 
use different strategies to shield themselves from insecurity: they downplay the issue or point to 
factors beyond their control. Two key motives for early pension take-up are the desire to secure 
the money for one’s family in the event of early death and to get the money while still vigorous. 
Informants typically imagine life after 80 as quiet and with fewer material demands. In conclusion, 
the analysis shows how adaptations to the flexible pension system are embedded in notions of 
ageing, institutional trust, and a newfound sense of ownership regarding one’s retirement savings.
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Introduction
In response to an ageing population, a number of countries in Europe have redesigned their old age pension systems in order to encourage people to work longer and delay retirement (Ebbinghaus 2011; Jensen 2020; OECD 2019). Early exit routes have 
become less accessible and attractive, while the state pension age has been raised (Euro-
pean Commission and the Social Protection Committee 2018; OECD 2019). Individuals 
are made more responsible for securing a sufficient level of income in old age and are 
expected to be knowledgeable and active in planning for retirement (Breit & Salomon 
2015; Vickerstaff & Cox 2005). There is widespread concern, however, that individuals 
have insufficient knowledge about how the pension systems in their countries actually 
work and thus, will not be able to make good decisions (Almenberg & Säve-Söderbergh 
2011; Chan & Stevens 2008). How individuals approach these choices and the infor-
mation strategies they use, are therefore points of concern in most countries around 
the world (Boisclair et al. 2017; Moffatt & Heaven 2017; van Rooij et al. 2012). This 
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article contributes to this debate by analyzing how individuals seek information about 
their retirement options and what concerns guide their decisions. The analysis is based 
on 28 qualitative interviews with older workers in Norway, a country where the pension 
system offers considerable flexibility with regard to combining work and pension and 
when and how to start pension take-up.
In Norway, ‘when to start drawing pension’ and ‘when to stop working’ are almost 
entirely decoupled. Most workers can start to draw pension at age 62, and they can 
continue in employment—and build their pension savings further—up to, in principle, 
age 75. During this period, they will have very high disposable incomes. The downside 
is that early take-up translates into lower annual sums for the rest of one’s life. This is 
the principle of actuarial neutrality, which stipulates that the total amount of pension 
over the life course should be the same regardless of when the individual starts take-
up. Workers in Norway accrue notional retirement ‘savings accounts’ and distribute 
the money in this account over the course of their lives as retirees. Few other coun-
tries offer similar flexibility with regard to both take-up and abilities to combine wages 
and pension in their mandatory state pension. Norway thus provides an apt setting for 
investigating how older workers reason about the financial aspects of their retirement 
decisions, including their thoughts on distribution of the finances over their life course. 
Combining work and pension is a popular option among older workers in Norway: 
in 2019, 50% of men and 25% of women aged 62–66 drew pension from the National 
Insurance while still working. We start from the assumption that their motivations for 
doing this are rooted in concerns that go well beyond mere financial calculations, includ-
ing consideration of information strategies, perceptions of various forms of savings, and 
preferences for spending here and now versus later as well as considerations of health 
and life expectancy. These issues are sociological rather than financial. We formulate 
two research questions: First, to what extent do workers in their late 50s and 60s seek 
information about the pension system and their own pension rights before making their 
decisions and what are their information strategies and sources? Second, which concerns 
and priorities motivate early take-up at the expense of lower incomes later? In exploring 
the second research question, we dig into the reasons that people provide for starting 
to draw (or not draw) pensions benefits, how they spend or plan to spend their pension 
drawings, how they reflect on possible tradeoffs between time and money, and their 
thoughts and possible concerns about their income in retirement. 
Since most countries do not offer their older workers the option of drawing pension 
early at the expense of lower incomes late in life, previous literature on decision-making 
in this context is scarce. This is also true in the Nordic countries, despite the similari-
ties between the Norwegian and the Swedish pension system (Salomon & Solem 2020). 
The study of pension take-up prior to labor market withdrawal sits uneasily at the 
intersection between the literature on financial planning on one hand and the literature 
on extended working lives on the other. The former overlooks the particular vulnerabili-
ties facing older workers, including most insights from social gerontology, and focuses 
mainly on decisions made earlier in life. This is even true for the literature on pen-
sion savings (see for instance Almenberg & Säve-Söderbergh 2011; James et al. 2020; 
Prabhakar 2017). The literature on extended working lives and retirement behavior typ-
ically analyzes the decision to withdraw (or not) from employment (recent contributions 
include Grødem & Kitterød 2021; Hellevik & Herlofson 2020; Jensen 2020; Nivalainen 
et al. 2020) and downplays pension take-up as a financial decision. 
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In what follows, we first elaborate on the intersection between behavioral econom-
ics and the sociology of late careers and old age, emphasizing, in particular, the barri-
ers to (economically) rational decision-making and the imagined life course. We then 
describe the Norwegian context in more detail before presenting our data and findings. 
The article ends with a concluding discussion. 
Economic rationality and the older worker
The Norwegian pension system was reformed in 2011, and the post-reform system allows 
for far more flexibility and hence, more individual choice than the old one. The pension 
reform was explicitly aimed at creating a system that is more transparent, allowing indi-
viduals to make well-founded choices (Breit & Salomon 2015). The new pension system 
is thus based on the assumption that people will be able to gather and use available 
information and undertake cost-benefit analyses in their preparations for retirement 
and in deciding how to accommodate the flexible options. Similar assumptions domi-
nate in several western countries (see for instance Almenberg & Säve-Söderbergh 2011; 
Brown & Vickerstaff 2011; Moffatt & Heaven 2017). A number of contributions, how-
ever, show that this is not how most people approach retirement decisions (Barr 2014; 
Bergene & Drange 2015; Chan & Stevens 2008; Hermansen & Midtsundstad 2013). 
Most people do not invest much time and energy in investigating their options, and 
they tend not to make financially optimal decisions. Building on insights from the lit-
erature on bounded rationality and behavioral economics, Barr (2014:61) distinguishes 
between ‘imperfect information’ and ‘non-rational behavior’ as two distinct weaknesses 
of national pension markets. 
The problem of imperfect information occurs for two fundamentally different rea-
sons: individuals may not bother to access available information, or the information 
they need does not exist. While ‘not bothering’ may sound irresponsible, it can be argued 
that ignorance can be rational. Downs (1957) argued that it is rational to remain igno-
rant when the cost of acquiring information is greater than the benefits one can derive 
from the information. Pension is typically perceived as a technical, abstract, and fun-
damentally dull issue (Bergene & Drange 2015), and many older workers may prefer 
to spend their time doing something more rewarding than digging into the intricacies 
of the pension system. Individuals who are far from the normative retirement age typi-
cally show limited interest in pensions, and even workers approaching this age can seem 
disinterested if they lack clear milestones to indicate when they should retire (Ekerdt 
et al. 2001).
Moreover, understanding pensions requires a certain level of financial literacy that 
many people simply do not have. The OECD regularly measures financial literacy across 
different countries, and the results are typically disheartening. In the scaling system used, 
a score of 21 indicates that an individual has acquired a basic level of understanding of 
financial concepts and applies some prudent principles in their financial dealings, and 
average scores for countries rarely exceed 14. Norway is one of the countries that score 
relatively high (an average of 14.5 in 2016, OECD 2017) yet still well below the thresh-
old of 21. It is more than likely that low financial literacy is a barrier towards gather-
ing and understanding information about national pension systems (see for instance 
Almenberg & Säve-Söderbergh 2011; Boisclair et al. 2017).
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Individuals who are eager to and able to access the available information may still 
be unable to grasp the full picture. In systems based on actuarial neutrality, decisions 
about retirement and pension take-up would ideally require information about one’s 
own death date, which, thankfully, is almost always out of reach. In addition, many 
pension schemes are in fact very complex, and sometimes experts disagree on what 
options and adjustments are actually most beneficial in economic terms (Lien 2012). The 
‘financially optimal’ decision may be impossible to determine. In addition, employees 
face uncertainty with regard to later working life and the transition to retirement. As 
noted by Ekerdt et al. (2001:169), ‘there appear to be eddies in the stream of workers 
flowing self-consciously toward retirement—people who do not readily know or admit 
their direction’. Similarly, Moffatt and Heaven (2017) hold that models of retirement 
decision-making, which view people as highly rational, should incorporate qualitative 
findings highlighting people’s lived experiences and trade-offs that they make in the 
process of undertaking retirement-related decisions. Acquiring optimal information and 
planning in accordance with these insights is of little use if circumstances keep shifting, 
and the ultimate outcome is, to some extent, beyond individual control. 
The notion of ‘non-rational behavior’ (Barr 2014) refers to informed decision- 
making that is suboptimal in financial terms. One mechanism that is likely to be impor-
tant for our purposes here is ‘present bias’, that is, the preference for rewards today 
rather than tomorrow (Barr 2014; James et al. 2020). This mechanism is well known in 
behavioral economics, but we know less about how the implication of ‘present bias’ may 
change over the life course and how it interacts with feelings of uncertainty and attitudes 
toward ageing. The choice that older workers have to make in Norway—between higher 
disposable incomes in their 60s and lower pensions later or higher pensions after retire-
ment—is an unusual one. The literature on pension savings brings up the issues of imag-
ined life courses (James et al. 2020), present bias, and inertia (Barr 2014; Foster 2012), 
but these studies tend to focus on the accumulation phase. The international research 
literature provides few pointers with regard to how individuals reason around spending 
their accumulated savings (but see Newall & Peacey 2021). 
Within social gerontology, an important approach to understanding the relation-
ship between ageing and money theorizes consumption practices later in life as embed-
ded in cultures of ageing and generations (Price & Livesey 2015). This notion draws 
on Gilleard and Higgs’ (2000) concept of ‘the third’ and ‘the fourth’ age; the third age 
is linked to the notion of ‘successful ageing’ and images of individual fulfillment and 
consumption. The fourth age, by contrast, is a ‘social imaginary’ characterized by frailty, 
withdrawal, and the loss of agency. Qualitative interviews suggest that informants hap-
pily plan for and save for the third age and death, but they neglect the period between 
‘active aging’ and death, that is, the fourth age (Price et al. 2014). In the fourth age, they 
reason, they will be in a care home, and ‘the discussions about care have no detail, no 
timelines, no trajectories and no plans’ (Price et al. 2014:406). The third age is for con-
sumption and that is when savings will be spent and capital, released. The fourth age is 
death’s waiting room, and money available in this phase has little value. 
In summary, the literature indicates that many informants will limit information 
gathering because they find pensions overly complex or because they feel that there is 
too much insecurity to make an optimal decision. We also expect to find a certain degree 
of present bias in the sense that those who have started—or intend to start—early take-
up do so because they value rewards now over security later. We do not know, however, 
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how present bias plays out when individuals plan for the final years of their lives. Our 
predictions are mainly based on findings in studies of savings behavior and opt-out 
options in occupational pensions. We do not know how this will play out in a system in 
which individuals’ entire retirement savings are subjected to the principle of actuarial 
neutrality and in which labor market behavior in ones 60s and the size of the pension in 
ones 80s are directly linked. We therefore proceed in an explorative fashion. 
The Norwegian context: senior employment and  
pension regulations 
Norway, as noted, provides a particularly useful context for studying how older work-
ers make decisions and how they think about the value of money now versus later. The 
architecture of the post-2011 pension system allows for early take-up and for flexible 
combinations of wages and pensions but at the cost of significantly lower pensions in 
later years. In this section, we present the pension system in more detail and provide 
further information about Norway as a context for our findings. 
The Norwegian pension system consists of three parts. The state National Insur-
ance scheme covers all residents. The public sector contractual pension (AFP) scheme 
covers all public sector employees, while the private sector AFP scheme covers about 
50% of private sector workers (Hippe et al. 2018). The two AFP schemes are similar 
for all covered; thus, there is no variation within each sector, but there are important 
differences between the public and private scheme. All employers are mandated to offer 
occupational pensions. Again, there are important differences between the public and 
private sector, and there is also a wide variety within the private sector (Grødem & 
Hippe 2020). 
Since 2011, the National Insurance old age pension in Norway has been fully flex-
ible, allowing take-up between ages 62 and 75 on actuarially neutral terms. Actuarial 
neutrality implies that the total amount of pension over the life course should be the 
same regardless of whether one starts take-up early or late. Therefore, the earlier the 
take-up, the lower the annual sum. This principle also means that individuals can com-
bine wages and pension and that annual pension amounts are not reduced for earn-
ings. Reducing pensions for earnings makes no sense when the individual ‘pays’ for 
early take-up through lower annual rates for the rest of their life. Older workers may 
take a partial pension in steps of 20%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 80%, and 100% of the full 
annual pension. The proportion can be changed annually, and pension drawings can be 
stopped at short notice. The 2011 reform also established the principle of life expectancy 
adjustment, meaning that annual pension amounts are reduced in accordance with the 
relevant birth cohorts’ life expectancy (though individual pensions are always life-long). 
As life expectancy continually increases, pensions will be lower in the future, and future 
workers will need to extend their working period in order to compensate (Grødem & 
Hippe 2020). Flexible retirement on actuarially neutral terms can thus be seen as a func-
tional equivalent to raising the pension age (for more on the Norwegian pension reform, 
see Pedersen 2017). The new rules are in full effect for cohorts born in 1963 and later, 
while transitional regulations apply for cohorts born between 1954 and 1962.
The AFP scheme was originally an early retirement scheme that allowed for early 
retirement at age 62 on comparatively generous terms. It was renegotiated as part of 
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the pension reform process. In these negotiations, the public and private sector parted 
ways (Hagelund & Grødem 2019). The trade unions in the private sector accepted that 
the principle of full flexibility on actuarially neutral terms was implemented in AFP in 
2011, while the reform process in the public sector took much longer. As late as 2019, 
when our interviews took place, the principle of actuarial neutrality was only partially 
implemented in the public sector. For that reason, we interviewed only workers who 
were employed in the private sector at the time of the interview, and we do not present 
public sector AFP and occupational pension further. 
Private sector AFP, like the National Insurance pension, can be claimed from age 
62 on actuarially neutral terms, implying that early take-up translates into lower annual 
rates. As such, it is a top-up pension for those who qualify. In order to qualify, the 
employee must be with an employer that is covered when they turn 62 and must have 
worked in a covered firm for at least seven out of the preceding nine years. Hence, an 
AFP benefit can easily be lost even if one has contributed to the scheme throughout one’s 
working career. This can happen for reasons beyond individual control, such as health 
problems or plant downsizing (Hippe et al. 2017). For this reason, AFP may contribute 
to the sense of insecurity and lack of predictability that some older workers feel (Moffat 
& Heaven 2017).
Private sector occupational pensions are mandatory (since 2006), but there is a 
great variety in savings rates. Generosity varies from a required minimum of 2% up to 
voluntary employer yearly savings rates of 7%, and a top-up can be made for higher 
incomes (Grødem & Hippe 2020). Practically all the new occupational pension schemes 
in the private sector are pure defined benefit (DC) savings schemes. Importantly, they 
offer payment for a period of 10 years or at least until the claimant turns 77. Most pri-
vate sector workers will therefore see a drop in their incomes after age 77, regardless of 
when they start drawing National Insurance pension and AFP.
A further important difference between the firm-based occupational pensions on 
one hand and National Insurance pension and AFP on the other, concerns the rules 
for inheritance. If a person dies before he or she has used up the money saved in DC 
schemes, their beneficiaries inherit the money according to rules specified for the differ-
ent schemes. The notional savings made in AFP and National Insurance return to the 
pension schemes and cannot be inherited. The family members lose this money when the 
insured person dies. 
To enhance the populations’ ability to make good decisions about retirement, the 
Norwegian Labor and Welfare Administration has developed a pension calculator where 
individuals can log in to check their notional pension savings and projected annual 
amounts (Breit & Salomon 2015). Private actors, including the major insurance compa-
nies, have developed similar calculators. The new flexibility also increased the demand 
for financial advice, which created a new market for the finance industry. One study 
showed that media coverage of the new system often took the form of expert advice and 
that advisors in the finance industry heavily dominated the expert sources (Hagelund 
& Grødem 2017). The finance industry also offers a number of courses and seminars 
targeted at employers or older employees. This industry thus plays an important role in 
‘translating’ the pension system for the public. 
The older workers approaching retirement in 2019 belong to the first generation 
in which both women and men have had fairly stable careers during their prime work-
ing age, although women still perform more part-time work than men and have more 
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extensive parental leaves (Ellingsæter & Jensen 2019). Compared to many other Euro-
pean countries, in Norway, employment rates among older adults are high, reflecting a 
tight labor market and people’s preferences and opportunities to work well into their 
60s, as well as the beneficial incentives structure in the pension system. In 2018, 72% of 
Norwegians aged 55–64 were employed, which is considerably above the EU-28 average 
(Eurostat 2019), and in recent years, the average actual retirement age has increased in 
Norway (Bjørnstad 2019). 
Norwegian adults in their 50s and 60s typically entered the housing market in the 
1990s and 2000s and have benefitted from a large increase in the values of their homes 
and other real estate. This is particularly true for those living in the Oslo region. In addi-
tion, a large proportion of adults in Norway own a cottage or a secondary home. Thus, 
many people now approaching retirement may count on a kind of private financial 
safety net later in their lives. Poverty rates among elderly pensioners have fallen sharply 
since the turn of the millennium. The most recent data indicate that 8.5% of old age 
pensioners had persistently low incomes, which is a lower figure than that of the general 
population (Epland & Thorsen 2019:53).
Data collection
Our analysis is based on qualitative interviews with 28 senior workers in Norway, con-
ducted in late autumn 2019. We wanted to capture a wide range of perspectives, thoughts, 
and considerations regarding flexible retirement options and selected informants based 
on the following criteria: an age between 55 and 66 years, in active employment in the 
private sector, and, for informants 62 years and older, the use of a combination of pen-
sion drawings and paid employment. Moreover, we required that informants had at least 
one child, lived with a partner or had previously done so, and had different levels of 
education. The decision to limit the sample to private sector workers was made to ensure 
that all informants related to similar occupational pensions, as described above. As for 
informants 62 years and older, the decision to include only those claiming pension ben-
efits was made because we were particularly interested in how they used the extra funds 
they had access to. Also, we assumed that those who claimed pension benefits had made 
more deliberate considerations as to whether to start uptake or not, compared to those 
who did not claim pensions, as suggested by Dahl and Galaasen (2013). We did not 
include fully retired individuals in the same age group, as we assumed that the decision 
to retire would be determined by a number of factors beyond the financial and because 
we wanted to interview those who could view pensions as ‘extra liquidity’ rather than 
as their main source of income. 
The informants were recruited by a survey institute, Kantar, via Facebook ads. Inter-
ested users could check whether they were in the target group, and those who passed 
were contacted by telephone so that the screening information could be verified. Prior 
to the qualitative interview, participants were given a letter outlining the purpose of the 
study and their rights to opt out at any time. All informants signed a consent form and 
were rewarded with a NOK 500 (app. 50 Euro) gift card. This amount was sufficient 
to cover travel costs and any other expenses associated with the interview and to thank 
participants for their time. We have no reason to believe that this affected the recruit-
ment process. 
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Interviews took place in Kantar offices. The interviewer first collected standard-
ized information about gender, age, marital status, employment (full-time or part-time), 
and the number of children. The rest of the interview was semi-structured and based 
on a comprehensive interview guide made by the research team. The interviewer was 
employed by Kantar and acted as our research assistant. We had several discussions 
with him to make sure he fully understood the purpose of the study. We also watched 
a sample of interviews via live streaming and gave feedback to the interviewer after 
each session. The interviews were transcribed by Kantar’s transcribers and transferred 
to us anonymously. We believe that outsourcing the interviewing to a third party had 
both costs and benefits. In this case, we had two main reasons for doing this. First, we 
assumed that outsourcing recruitment to a professional firm would ensure a more var-
ied sample than the samples we might have obtained using other methods. Second, and 
more importantly, the main topics of the study dealt with the informants’ knowledge 
and utilizations of the flexible options in the pension system. Based on previous studies, 
we had reason to believe that informants’ knowledge could be limited, and we feared 
that informants might feel embarrassed to display their ignorance to a researcher in the 
field. The interviewer sometimes feigned ignorance if informants asked for more detail 
but also provided pieces of information throughout the interview. This turned out to 
work very well. Although we may have lost some information as a result of not being 
able to see informants’ body language and the lack of the ability to follow up with more 
in-depth questions when informants brought up an unexpected topic, we believe that the 
information lost in this way is not crucial. 
In light of later developments, it is worth pointing out that our informants were 
interviewed before the COVID-19 pandemic hit Europe. Considerations and insecurities 
linked to the pandemic and the ensuing social distancing measures are thus not reflected. 
For practical reasons, all informants lived in the Oslo region. We interviewed 15 
men and 13 women; 10 were aged 55–61 years and 18, aged 62–66 years. Twenty-three 
of the informants were married, two were cohabiting, and three lived alone; all were 
native (nonimmigrant) Norwegians. Seven held a master’s degree, 13 held a bachelor’s 
degree, eight had a secondary or primary level of education, and there was a wide vari-
ety of professions represented. Five informants (those aged 55–56 years) will accumu-
late National Insurance retirement pension according to the new accumulation rules 
that took effect from 2011, while informants 57 years and older will accumulate pen-
sion according to both new and old rules. However, the flexible options for combining 
work and pension benefits introduced in 2011 apply to all cohorts. An overview of the 
informants is provided in the appendix. The numbers assigned to the informants in the 
appendix table reflect the order of interviewing and are used to identify informants in 
the quotes in the analytical section. 
To analyze the data, we first read the interview transcripts one by one, examining 
the thoughts and reflections of each individual informant. We strived to understand 
their perspectives and considerations while at the same time searching for common pat-
terns in practices, reasoning, and the way the informants talked about their pension 
planning or lack thereof. We used codes based on the topics in the interview guide and 
supplemented them with codes that emerged from our reading and interpretation of 
the interviews. Working with this study, we alternated between using the codes and 
rereading the entire interviews in order to ensure that we understood the various state-
ments correctly within the context of each individual situation. In particular, we looked 
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carefully at the informants’ various reasons and reflections concerning why they had 
decided to draw pension benefits, how they would spend the money, and their thoughts 
about their household finances in retirement. For several of the participants, these topics 
were closely intertwined, and some provided slightly diverging information and opin-
ions throughout the interview. As we will see, some also expressed themselves somewhat 
imprecisely and hesitantly and used many auxiliary words, and this probably suggests 
that they found some topics difficult or had not thought much about them. 
Analysis 
The role of information and advice 
As we would expect from studies of financial literacy and information-gathering under 
the new pension system, there was considerable variety among our informants in how 
much they knew about pension regulations, their own pension schemes, and to what 
extent they actively sought advice and information and prepared financially for retire-
ment. On one hand, there were informants who appeared to be quite knowledgeable 
about both the system at large and their own pension package. These informants were 
either 62 years or older, and/or had a background in economic studies, economic man-
agement, or the finance sector. These best-informed informants appeared proactive and 
collected information from several sources, such as public and private web portals, 
counselors in banking and insurance companies, HR managers, and the popular media. 
The best informed had typically started to plan whether and how to draw pension ben-
efits from the age of 62, several years in advance, and talked in terms of cost-benefit 
analyses, a calculated risk, and keeping track of their Excel schemes. These informants 
had arrived at different conclusions depending on their particular situations and prefer-
ences, but they had thought carefully through the pros and cons of various solutions.
On the other hand, some informants appeared to be fundamentally alienated. Some 
of them were not even aware of the flexible pension option, while others had learned 
about it more or less by coincidence. These informants typically did not have educa-
tion at the college/university level, and they were employed in working class jobs (e.g., 
transport, reception, kindergarten). This is however not the full picture. There were also 
informants in this group with higher education and/or managerial jobs; this particular 
group tended to be younger than well-informed informants with higher education and 
typically reasoned that retirement was still some years away and many factors could still 
change. These less-informed respondents sometimes thought that pension-related issues 
were completely incomprehensible, a ‘rough terrain’, and extremely boring, as demon-
strated by the following quote: ‘…then we return to the whole pension thing that is so 
unclear and incomprehensible, and I think it is so strange for me [….] No, I think that’s 
weird, the whole system really’ (#19, woman, 63, reception).
The less-informed respondents were (unsurprisingly) less systematic in their quest 
for information and typically relied strongly on a few informal sources: their HR man-
agers, a counselor from a financial institution hired by the employer, or family or friends. 
For instance, one informant explained that he knew very little about his own pension 
rights but had started to draw pension at the age of 62 because his partner had told him 
to do so. She was the ‘minister of finance’ in their relationship, and he relied fully on her 
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advice (#17, Man, 64, transport). Likewise, another informant was completely unaware 
of her options until her HR manager told her about the possibility to start claiming AFP 
benefits shortly before she turned 62 and portrayed this as a very generous option. The 
informant commented that she had never bothered to think through these questions her-
self and ‘blindly’ trusted the HR manager’s recommendations (#14, woman, 64, creative 
enterprise).
Some of the insecurity stemmed from the complexity of individuals’ lives and work-
ing careers. Some of our informants had tried to seek information but were overwhelmed 
by the complexities that arose in their particular case. This included individuals who had 
worked in different countries, alternated between the public and private sector, or had 
spells of self-employment. Some of our informants confirmed the concern brought up 
by Breit and Salomon (2015) and noted that they had been more confused after try-
ing the online calculators. In other cases, the complexity stemmed from the fact that 
it is impossible to divine the future. The best-informed informants were aware of the 
importance of life expectancy; one called it ‘a bet against the state’ or ‘a genes lottery’. In 
addition, there were a number of events beyond individual control, such as an employer 
changing their occupational pension scheme, or the potential of reorganizations to lead 
informants to lose their AFP. Some of the younger informants also worried that ‘those 
politicians’ might change the rules in the years to come. 
While we found some tendencies linked to age and education, it was difficult to sort 
the informants into two neat piles: the ‘well-informed’ and the ‘confused’. There was a 
great deal of uncertainty across the board, and practically none of the informants were 
confident that they had made, or were about to make, the optimal choice. Practically 
all the informants had engaged in some information-seeking strategies: pondering the 
advice of family members, colleagues, or friends who they regarded as more knowledge-
able, taking a course organized by the employer, trying out the online calculators, and 
reading about pension coverage in the popular media. Practically all knew the basics of 
the reformed pension system; in particular, the principle of working longer and getting 
a higher pension later was well established. Although informants knew that this was 
the main principle, some of them worried about possible loopholes and exceptions, and 
many had only a vague idea of what this actually implied for them. Strikingly, many of 
the informants who had started take-up seemed to metaphorically cover their ears and 
refused to listen to information that might make them doubt their choices, as illustrated 
by the following quotes: 
I kind of thought I should sit down one day and do the calculations, but it is too late now. 
I have been drawing (benefits) for almost five years now (#25, man, 66, economist).
Anyway, I was told that I ought to [start take-up], but others have been told not to do so. 
And I’m thinking like, yes, maybe I made a mistake there, or well…But again, you don’t 
know. What is done is done (#19, woman, 63, reception). 
But I thought that now I have to stand by what I have done. So now, I just have to let it 
play out. …. In [the tabloids] on Saturdays, there is always something about pensions [….]. 
And then you have slightly different statements. Some say [early take-up] paid off, while 
others say it did not pay off. Then, I think, don’t read this because you have made a choice 
now. I can’t turn back time (#22, woman, 64, sales). 
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These three informants had started take-up but remained unsure whether this was the 
‘right’ choice. Even knowledgeable informants had to stop the information-gathering 
somewhere and ‘stand by what they had done’. At some point, informants just wanted 
to avoid the good advice, the doubts, and insecurities. 
Why start early take-up? 
We imagined that informants could approach the issue of whether to start take-up in 
one out of two ways: they could start (or plan to start) take-up early because they believe 
this would give them the maximum total amount or because they want extra money 
to spend, invest, or give to children. The reality, we found, was far more complex. As 
already shown, most informants were confused with regard to what would ‘pay off’, 
and many took advice from more or less random ‘experts’. Some started early take-up 
because they wanted to secure the rights they had before the employers snatched them 
away (one informant said he had been told by a professional advisor, ‘When you get the 
chance, take the money and run’). Besides, informants typically mentioned more than 
one reason for drawing pension throughout the interview. In the same breath, they could 
talk about how they thought it was ‘smart’ to secure the money and also about how they 
enjoyed having extra funds for various purposes. 
Motivations for starting early take-up, then, were not clear-cut, neither were saving 
strategies or money management once they had the money in hand. Here, too, we found 
a continuum: some informants were determined not to touch their pension savings until 
they were fully retired, while others did not exactly know where the money went—it just 
disappeared into the regular household budget. In between these extremes were infor-
mants who saved some and spent some and those who saved but allowed themselves to 
dip into savings if they needed extra cash. Savings strategies also varied: some paid off 
loans, others co-invested in property with their children (in other words, helped their 
children in the housing market), many saved in a bank account or in stocks or mutual 
funds, and one informant saved the money in cash at home because the bank currently 
pays no interest anyway.
Hence, we did not find clear distinctions between smart investors and hedonistic 
spenders. However, two motivations for starting early take-up materialized: securing the 
money for family and living an active life while they still could. 
As noted, DC schemes in the private sector can be inherited by the deceased’s fam-
ily, while DB schemes, hybrid schemes, and AFP and National Insurance pension are lost 
when the insured person dies. The awareness of this among our informants was strong—
surprisingly strong, given how confused many of them were about the system at large. 
Informants typically described their pension accrual as something they were entitled to 
and that should not go to ‘the larger society’ or ‘the general pension scheme’ if they them-
selves passed away. Some talked about securing the money for themselves and enjoying 
it while they could, while others wanted their families to have the money (‘If something 
should happen, at least my husband or my children will get the money’). Some portrayed 
such reflections as a main motivation for pension take-up, while others mentioned them 
more as secondary thoughts —they were not sure if it was a wise decision to draw pension 
benefits but had started more or less by chance and commented that their money would at 
least not ‘go back to the system’, as a reasonable hindsight justification. 
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The informants who said they drew or would draw pension early in order to secure 
the money for their families, referred to this as a purely financial decision. They would 
take the money, store it, and continue to work and live as before. Others, however, 
wanted the money because they wanted to make some changes to their lives: either 
downscale work, travel more, or both. These informants clearly made a distinction 
between the value of money now versus the value of money later: Now, they were rela-
tively young, fit, and vigorous. Later, they would be old and have very different needs 
and priorities. For some, this was an argument for downscaling work and enjoying the 
good life: 
No, then I think that [both my husband and I] like to be in good shape, and it would be 
nice to have more time while we can still go for long walks and stay outdoors and take 
long ski trips, hikes in the mountains, bike, and go out with the boat while we are still 
vigorous enough to enjoy it (#2, woman, 56, project manager in bank). 
Regardless of whether informants planned to retire early or not, they typically commu-
nicated clear distinctions between the value of money now versus the value of money 
later. They typically conveyed the belief that they would lead more quiet lives as they 
aged and thus, would not need that much money later in life. This image was surpris-
ingly strong among our informants. The image they presented was not one of misery, 
dementia, and the need for care but rather of peace, rest, and moderation: 
It is more important to have that money a little earlier too. So that you have a bit of 
[money] and are in good health in your late 60s and maybe get to spend that money rather 
than just having, like, new wheels on the walker. You don’t need to change the tires on that 
one (#23, man, 56, sales, strategic planning). 
So it does not cost that much to […pursue my hobby]. And I have books to last me 
until my late 80s: petrol for the lawnmower, milk for my tea. […] I simply believe that 
the expenses do not need to be that big when you have passed 70 (#16, man, 64, IT  
development).
Informants did not typically have clear ideas about when this ‘later’ started, but most 
indicated some time between ages 70 and 90. Typically, however, these reflections came 
up when the interviewer reminded them that their occupational pension probably ended 
at 77, and the informants responded by thinking out loud about what life would look 
like at this point. As the quotes exemplify, they imagined quieter lives with simpler 
needs: milk in the tea, books, and functioning walkers and lawnmowers. 
A final point should be mentioned with regard to early take-up: some informants 
used or planned to use this as a substitute for health-related benefits. They enjoyed 
their work but thought it was too tiring to work full time. They did not want to take 
sick leave or to discuss possible adjustments with their boss but would rather solve the 
problem by working reduced hours combined with pension drawings. For instance, one 
participant explained that when his former employer had to downsize some years ago, 
he began to consider drawing pension benefits. An important driver was that he often 
got very tired because of health-related pains. Even though he was soon offered a full-
time job in another firm, he preferred to continue his adaptation with pension take-up 
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and reduced working hours, which he believed made him feel better. Other informants 
considered similar adaptations in the near future. 
Living with uncertainty
Our informants are consistently told, via the media and by authority figures, that they 
need to make ‘smart’ decisions with regard to pensions. Many felt a little guilty that 
they had not spent more resources on researching the issue, and practically nobody was 
confident that they had made the optimal decision or, for those younger than 62, would 
be able to do so. This created an uncomfortable tension, which our informants devel-
oped strategies to manage. The imagined life course, where informants tell themselves 
that their need for consumption will decline sometime in their 70s, can be seen as one 
such coping mechanism, a way to create predictability in an unpredictable landscape. 
Besides, we found that our informants placed a great deal of trust in the institutions. 
Our informants reasoned that if things seemed to work out pretty well for most people 
in retirement, it should go well for them too. Moreover, they typically expressed great 
confidence in the welfare state; there would always be some type of safety net. ‘We live in 
Norway after all’, one informant said, apparently inferring that ‘Norway’ was in itself a 
form of security. It is worth noting that the same informants could also express distrust 
in politicians (who might change the rules) and employers (who might alter their occu-
pational schemes), and some of them had little detailed knowledge about the pension 
system as such. Taken together, this suggests that the institutional trust is general rather 
than specific. Older workers may not trust politicians, employers, or even individual 
welfare schemes, but they still trust that the Norwegian welfare system will somehow 
take care of them (see Ellingsæter & Pedersen 2016 for similar findings on the family 
policy system). 
In addition, many informants highlighted the other assets they had access to. Many 
of our informants had little or no debt, and when asked whether they had private pen-
sion saving schemes, several pointed out that they considered repaying their loans to 
be the best way to save for retirement. In addition, many had stocks and bonds, most 
owned homes in the Oslo region, and many also had a cabin, a pleasure boat, and/or a 
caravan. These assets, in addition to their homes, were typically fully paid for and could 
be sold in order to free up capital. Strikingly, many informants envisioned moving to 
smaller flats or out of the urban center. Many informants expressed a willingness to 
downscale and emphasized how they would be perfectly content with a frugal lifestyle. 
Across the socioeconomic spectrum, participants would talk about priorities, downscal-
ing, and the option of realizing assets. In addition to cheaper or more modest housing, 
one could always manage with a smaller car, one car instead of two, less expensive 
holiday trips abroad, etc., and thus be able to realize the vision of an active ‘third age’. 
Interestingly, while most respondents expressed little worry for their personal 
finances in retirement, some commented that the younger generations would proba-
bly be worse off. They would have to plan more carefully and start saving at an early 
age, and they would need to discuss pension benefits with their employers. Because of 
increasing life expectancy, they would also need to work longer in order to obtain rea-
sonable pension payments. Compared to the younger generations, the participants in 
our study believed that they themselves belonged to a generation that had ‘drawn the 
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golden ticket’ and were indeed lucky not to have to worry much about their future pen-
sion payments.
Discussion
Older workers in Norway have been granted a great deal of flexibility and opportunities 
to tailor their pension to their needs. Pension can be taken early or late, fully or partly, 
and one can continue to work full-time or part-time while drawing pension. This gives 
individuals considerable freedom in a certain period of life, but it also exposes them 
to some potentially tough choices. Through qualitative interviews with older workers 
(aged 55–66 years), we have investigated two interrelated questions: to what extent 
do older workers seek information about the pension system before making their deci-
sions, and which concerns and priorities motivate early take-up at the expense of lower 
incomes later?
As expected, based on the literature in the area (see for instance Barr 2014; Bergene 
& Drange 2015; Breit & Salomon 2015), we found that there are a number of barriers 
to information-seeking concerning this topic. Some informants read up, gathered infor-
mation from several sources, and tried to make informed choices, but many pounced 
on whatever advice they were given by someone they assumed knew better: a colleague 
or manager, friend or family member, or an expert at a course their employer sent them 
to. Many of our informants found pensions boring or ‘weird’, and many undoubtedly 
had limited financial literacy. Other informants displayed excellent financial literacy—
some of them had backgrounds in economics or accounting—and had a good overview, 
but they also knew that there were limits to their knowledge. They knew that in order 
to make optimal decisions, they would need to divine their own date of death. They 
also knew that the system in itself is complex and contains a number of pitfalls (most 
severely, the risk of losing AFP rights for individuals below the age of 62), and some of 
them had found that even the professional experts were unable to give exact advice on 
‘what pays’ (Lien 2012). In some ways, we could say that the main difference between 
the best-informed informants and the rest was that the former were more precise with 
regard to why it was impossible to ‘be smart’. 
So far, our findings are in line with expectations. The desire to be ‘smart’ combined 
with insufficient information created a tension for most informants, and existing litera-
ture says little about how older workers cope with the discomfort such tension entails. 
We found that one widespread coping mechanism was to downplay the issue, while 
often accentuating the inherent unpredictability of life. Another was to shield oneself 
from information once the decision was made. A third was to design a prospective life 
course, where they ‘knew’ that demands for consumption would be lower at some point. 
A fourth option was to emphasize their trust in the generic Norwegian welfare system, 
while also pointing to property and consumption goods they owned and could sell and 
their ability to live frugally on lower incomes. 
Our second research question concerned the informants’ valuation of money now 
versus money later, which speaks to what is termed ‘present bias’ in the literature. As 
noted, we know little about the specificities of such bias among workers approaching 
retirement and, ultimately, the final phases of life. Our observations regarding the imag-
ined life course are highly relevant for this question. Imagining a quiet phase toward 
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the end of life not only gives a sense of control, it also assigns a significantly higher 
value to money one receives in ones 60s over money received in one’s 80s. The way our 
informants talked about this went beyond the present bias known from the economic 
literature—our informants honestly believed that they would desire money less in 15–20 
years than they did at present. In their 60s and well into their 70s, they envisioned an 
active life of traveling and consumption; in their 80s, they envisioned a more passive, 
yet content, life. These visions were informed by a strong sense of trust in Norwegian 
welfare institutions, which were assumed to be strong enough to cushion any overly 
negative outcomes. 
Money received ‘now’ also had alternative functions beyond mere consumption. 
The two alternative functions we identified indicate certain unintended consequences of 
transforming a pension system from mainly DB with a fixed pension age, to a DC (sav-
ings) system with flexibility and actuarial neutrality. One seems to happen at the ideas 
level: Traditionally, old age pension has been understood as collective insurance against 
the ‘risk’ of being old. In the new institutional setup with full flexibility and notional 
pension accounts for individuals, some older workers have come to view their pension 
accrual as their money that they want to secure for themselves and their families before 
death cheats them out of it. This logic seems to underpin at least some of our informants’ 
thinking and is a key factor when informants (plan to) start pension withdrawal early 
and save/invest the money. Informants who follow this logic want to secure the money 
for their families in the event of their own death because it is rightfully their money. In 
this, we may see the imprint of the finance industry as a key actor in making sense of the 
new pension system (Hagelund & Grødem 2017). 
The second (officially) unintended consequence relates to the use of flexible old 
age pension as a substitute for health-related benefits. Some of our informants said 
they wanted to downscale because their health situation no longer allowed for full-
time work. These informants avoided taking up health benefits—as might have been 
their right—and opted instead, for partial retirement. This spared them the hassle and 
potential indignity of having to apply for benefits with complex entrance criteria, but 
it also meant that they would receive lower pensions for the rest of their lives. Similar 
adaptations can be imagined for unemployment. This suggests an individualization of 
risk for workers above the age of 62, which, at worst, will weaken their protection both 
as workers and as users of welfare services. 
The coping strategies of older workers who have to make financial decisions in the 
midst of uncertainty, the influence of the imagined life course (the ‘third and ‘fourth’ 
age) on financial decisions, and the creative ways in which these workers may use the 
flexibility that the system allows, are all topics that are largely unexplored in the existing 
literature. The literature on financial planning, including saving for retirement, tends to 
focus on earlier life phases, while the literature on older workers’ decision-making and 
thoughts on retirement focuses heavily on the decision to withdraw from employment. 
Against this background, we believe the analysis presented here adds to the literature. 
Nevertheless, this study has limitations regarding the degree of generalizability. First, 
we have stressed that the Norwegian pension system offers flexibility and an incen-
tive structure that is different from those of most other countries. This makes it an 
apt case for investigation of older workers’ financial decisions as we have argued, but 
it implies that findings must be translated to other contexts rather than ‘generalized’. 
Moreover, Norway is a rich country with a generally affluent population. It is likely 
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that older workers in less affluent countries with less comprehensive welfare institutions 
will express more financial stress and less institutional trust. It is even possible that the 
image from Norway would be different if the interviews had been carried out a few 
months later, when the COVID-19 pandemic introduced new forms of insecurity in the 
working life and beyond. Third, all our informants were 55 or older and still employed. 
This implies that we have excluded workers with unstable work contracts and/or health 
problems, who are often excluded from the working life by 55. Also, our informants 
owned homes in the Oslo region, where housing prices are higher than anywhere else in 
Norway. Taken together, these suggest that our informants were all comparatively well 
off. Worries about the future may be more prominent among older workers who are less 
resourceful and more vulnerable to labor market exclusion. Also, the concerns of older 
workers in Norway—even resourceful older workers—may change over time as the new 
pension system matures and the life expectancy adjustment lowers pension amounts for 
everybody. Indeed, the ways in which different opportunities and different adaptations 
to a flexible system will affect patterns of inequality in old age will be an important topic 
for future research. 
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Appendix. List of informants
# Gender/Age Education Work Partner/Children
1 Man/56 Low Finance manager Married/3
2 Woman/56 High Project manager in bank Married/3
3 Woman/60 Low Kindergarten assistant, 40% Married/2
4 Woman/55 Medium Flight attendant No partner/2
5 Man/58 Medium Manager Married/3
6 Man/59 High Secretariat, NGO Married/2
7 Woman/57 Low Sales Married/1
8 Woman/56 Medium Building manager Married/1
9 Man/63 Medium Construction manager Married/2
10 Man/64 Medium Electrical power supply Cohabiting/2
11 Woman/61 Low Kindergarten, senior position No partner/2
12 Woman/63 Medium IT security Married/4
13 Man/60 Medium Health worker Married/4
14 Woman/64 Medium Creative enterprise Married/2
15 Man/65 High Sales manager Married/2
16 Man/64 High IT development, 80% Married/3
17 Man/64 Low Transport Married/2
18 Woman/63 Low Publishing Married/2
19 Woman/63 Low Reception Cohabiting/1
20 Man/64 Medium Engineer Married/1
21 Woman/64 Low Administrator (education) Married/2
22 Woman/64 Medium Sales Married/2
23 Man/56 High Sales (strategic planning) Married/2
24 Man/64 Medium Oil industry Married/5
25 Man/66 Medium Economist Married/2
26 Woman/65 High International affairs Married/2
27 Man/55 Medium Project manager No partner/2
28 Man/63 High Hydropower Married/3
